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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE SUPREME COURT TAKES
A STANCE WITH PLAIN VIEW SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES-Arizona v. Hicks
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the decision in Arizona v. Hicks,' the Supreme Court
never had held unequivocally that probable cause was required to
invoke the plain view doctrine. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,'
the landmark plain view seizure case,' the Court discussed three
elements required for a plain view seizure but did not, at any point
in the opinion, state that probable cause was required to seize an
item in plain view. The Court stated that, for a plain view seizure
to be constitutional, a police officer must have a prior justification
for the intrusion, i.e., exigent circumstances; the discovery of the
item must be inadvertent; and it must be immediately apparent to
the officer that he has evidence before him.4 Of the three require-
ments, only the immediately apparent element speaks to the de-
gree of certainty an officer must have before seizing an item, but it
fails to define that degree.' The failure to define that degree of
certainty has caused inconsistency in the law, with some courts
holding that a standard as low as mere suspicion is sufficient, while
others have held that a standard greater than probable cause is
required.6 Since Coolidge, the Supreme Court also has been unde-
cided on the requisite degree of certainty, as evidenced by Payton
v. New York,7 which suggested probable cause must be met, and
Texas v. Brown,8 which regarded the matter as unresolved.9
Arizona v. Hicks settled this uncertainty as to the standard of
certainty an officer must have to seize items he believes to be evi-
1. 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987), aff'g 146 Ariz. 533, 707 P.2d 331 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1985).
2. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
3. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great
"Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047 (1975).
4. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
5. Moylan, supra note 3, at 1084.
6. Id.
7. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
8. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
9. 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
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dence. The Hicks Court held that probable cause was the required
standard to invoke the plain view doctrine. 10 This decision benefits
the courts in that they now have a bright-line test to determine if
evidence seized in plain view is admissible at trial. Conversely, this
decision may prove to be very detrimental to effective law enforce-
ment when police seize items in plain view they believe to be evi-
dence of criiie, but the items ultimately are inadmissible because
the officer's reasonable belief did not measure up to the standard
of probable cause.
This Note will assess the ramifications and effect of Arizona v.
Hicks on existing search and seizure law and law enforcement in
general. Further, it will propose and evaluate a more flexible alter-
native approach that the Court could have taken.
THE CASE
Arizona v. Hicks involved a lawful warrantless entry into an
apartment after a shot fired in that apartment injured a man in a
downstairs apartment.1 The police entered the apartment to
search for the shooter, other victims, and weapons. 2 During the
search of the apartment, the officers found and seized three weap-
ons, ammunition, and a stocking mask.' 3 One of the officers noticed
two sets of stereo equipment. " Suspecting they were stolen,", the
officer recorded the serial numbers of the components, including a
turntable and a few other pieces which the officer had to move in
order to ascertain and record the numbers.' After calling in the
serial numbers to headquarters, the officer was notified that the
turntable was stolen property, and he immediately seized the turn-
table. 17 Subsequently, Hicks was indicted for the robbery of the
stereo equipment. 8
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1152. The exigent circumstance exception to the warrant require-
ment justified the initial entry.
12. Id.
13. Id. One of the weapons the officers found was a sawed-off shotgun.
14. Id.
15. Id. The officer suspected they were stolen because the stereos were ex-
pensive and of the kind that typically are stolen, and the apartment was practi-
cally bare of furniture except for a few pieces and the stereo. See also id. at 1156.
16. Id. at 1152.
17. Id. Later it was determined that some of the other pieces were stolen,
and these were seized after a warrant was obtained.
18. Id.
[Vol. 10:331
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Respondent Hicks moved to suppress the seized stereo equip-
ment, contending that the officer who moved the equipment to re-
cord the serial number made a warrantless search without probable
cause. 19 The Arizona Superior Court granted the motion and the
State appealed.20 The lower court relied on a statement from
Mincey v. Arizona2" that a "warrantless search must be 'strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.' ',22 The
Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court on grounds that
the search of the stereo equipment was unconstitutional because it
was unrelated to the justification for the initial entry.2 Both lower
courts rejected the State's contention that the officer's actions were
justified under the plain view doctrine of Coolidge.2" The State ap-
pealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review, and
thereafter the State petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for certiorari."
At the Supreme Court level, the State argued that there had
been "neither a 'search' nor a 'seizure.' -2 The Supreme Court
agreed that the "mere recording of the serial numbers did not con-
stitute a seizure";2 7 however, the Court held the officer's moving of
the components to see the serial numbers constituted a search dis-
tinct from the original justification for entering the apartment.28
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
22. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385
(1975)). "The Court of Appeals viewed the obtaining of the serial numbers. . . as
an additional search, unrelated to that exigency." Id.
23. Id. The United States Supreme Court made it clear in its opinion that
"the search was not ipso facto unreasonable" because it was unrelated to the jus-
tification for entering the apartment. Id. at 1153. "That lack of relationship al-
ways exists with regard to action validated under the 'plain view' doctrine." Id.
The Court clarified Mincey by stating that Mincey simply addressed the scope of
the primary search itself and did not overrule the plain view doctrine by implica-
tion. Id. at 1153.
24. Id. at 1152. The trial court explicitly rejected the plain view justification,
and the court of appeals rejected it also by implication. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court stated that recording the serial numbers was "the first step
in a process by which respondent was eventually deprived of the stereo equipment
[but) in and of itself . . . it did not 'meaningfully interfere' with respondent's
possessory interest in either the serial numbers or the equipment, and therefore
did not amount to a seizure." Id.
28. Id. The Court stated it was a search in the fourth amendment sense be-
19881
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After establishing that there had been a search, the Court next ad-
dressed the issue of whether the search was reasonable. It held
that it was not because it was based only on a reasonable suspi-
cion,2 9 which is a less strict standard than probable cause .3 The
Court rationalized its holding by stating, "No reason is apparent
why an object should routinely be seizable on lesser grounds, dur-
ing an unrelated search and seizure, than would have been needed
to obtain a warrant for that same object if it had been known to be
on the premises."31
BACKGROUND AND CASE HISTORY
Prior to the 1970s, plain view searches and seizures were asso-
ciated with searches incident to arrest.32 The plain view doctrine
exception to the warrant requirement was not recognized until
1971.13 In many of the earlier cases, such as Marron v. United
States4 and Harris v. United States,35 the Court used neither the
term "plain view" nor any similar language. In Marron and Harris,
the Court upheld the search and seizure of plain view evidence and
contraband on the grounds that the defendants committed the
criminal activity in the officers' presence; therefore, a search of the
area in the arrestees' control was justified, and any evidence or
contraband the officers came across could be seized as incident to
the lawful arrest. 6
In Marron, prohibition agents had obtained a warrant to
search for "intoxicating liquors and articles for their manufac-
ture ' 37 at an alleged speakeasy. When they entered the room, they
observed one of the defendants serving drinks to several of the pa-
trons and immediately placed him under arrest. 8 During their
cause moving the equipment as opposed to merely looking at it involved an addi-
tional invasion of respondent's privacy. Id.
29. Id. at 1153. (Justice Powell, dissenting, stated that the "State was unwise
to concede the absence of probable cause." Id. at 1156.)
30. Id. at 1153.
31. Id. at 1154.
32. Moylan, supra note 3, at 1050. The author states that plain view was
used as a "mere descriptive phrase" such as "plain sight" or "open view," and the
phrase was "always in lower case." Id.
33. Id. at 1067.
34. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
35. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
36. See Harris, 331 U.S. 145; Marron, 275 U.S. 192.
37. Marron, 275 U.S. at 193.
38. Id. at 194.
[Vol. 10:331
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search for the liquor and manufacturing instruments, they seized a
ledger and various bills that were associated with the management
of the speakeasy. 9 Over Marron's objections, 0 the ledger and bills
were introduced as evidence at trial.4
1
The Supreme Court upheld the seizure and introduction of the
ledger and bills on the grounds that one of the defendants had ac-
tually been engaged in criminal activity when the agents entered
the room and since the agents "were authorized to arrest for crime
being committed in their presence. . . [t]hey had a right without a
warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to seize
the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise '. 4 2 Further, the
Court stated that the officers were justified in searching all parts of
the premises in the defendant's immediate possession and control
that were used for the "unlawful purpose."4 s Thus, the Court legit-
imated -warrantless searches and seizures of evidence and contra-
band that follow a lawful arrest when the scope of the search is the
areas within the arrestee's immediate possession and control.
Similarly, in Harris, the Court upheld a search of the defend-
ant's apartment and seizure of United States draft cards in his
possession on the same grounds as in Marron. Harris involved a
search of defendant's apartment for two cancelled checks, pursu-
ant to a warrant charging mail fraud and a warrant charging a vio-
lation of the National Stolen Property Act.4 4 One of the agents in-
volved in the search discovered a sealed envelope that contained
several draft cards.4 5 The defendant subsequently was indicted and
convicted for possessing the draft cards, a federal offense.46 The
Court reasoned that, even though the warrant particularly de-
scribed not the draft cards but rather the two cancelled checks,
when the officers executed the arrest warrants they were justified
39. Id.
40. Marron was the lessee of an entire floor of a building that housed the
speakeasy. Id. at 193.
41. Id. at 194.
42. Id. at 198. The government contended the seizure could be justified on
two grounds-as either an incident to the execution of the search warrant or as an
incident to arrest. The Court rejected the first ground by stating that items seized
must be particularly described in the warrant and that general searches are viola-
tive of basic fundamental rights. Id. at 194, 195; see also Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
43. Marron, 275 U.S. at 199.
44. 331 U.S. at 148.
45. Id. at 149.
46. Id.
1988]
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in searching the premises under the defendant's immediate con-
trol-the entire apartment. 47 When the officers "came upon prop-
erty of the United States,"' 8 the defendant was "guilty of a serious
and continuing offense,"' 9 and because a crime was being commit-
ted in the "presence of the agents,"50 they were justified under the
fourth amendment to seize the instrumentalities of that crime."1
Conversely, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,52 the
officers arrested the defendant based on an "insufficient com-
plaint" s and then proceeded to search defendant's place of busi-
ness. 54 The officers seized the defendant's private papers and let-
ters, and the defendant moved to have them returned and
suppressed as evidence.55 The Supreme Court agreed with the de-
fendant, holding that "the search and seizure were unreasonable
and violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments."" The Court
pointed out that the arrest was invalid and that "no felony or mis-
demeanor had been committed or carried on in the presence of the
officers. ' 57 It also distinguished Marron by stating that no general
search had been made in Marron, as it had here, and the evidence
that had been seized in Marron was discovered incidentally." This
latter language, that of inadvertent discovery, demonstrates the
Court's first conceptualizations of the plain view doctrine as es-
poused in Coolidge.
In Trupiano v. United States,5 9 which was one of the earliest
47. Id. at 151.
48. Id. at 154.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
53. Id. at 346. The complaint was insufficient because it "was verified merely
on information and belief and did not state facts sufficient to constitute an of-
fense." See also id. at 355.
54. Id. at 349, 350. Officers went to the defendant's place of business and told
the defendants they had arrest warrants and a warrant to search the premises for
violations of the National Prohibition Act. The arrest warrant was invalid, and
the officers did not have a search warrant. By threat of force they made the de-
fendants open desks and the safe from which they seized papers, journals, account
books, letter files, insurance policies, cancelled checks, index cards, and various
other personal papers belonging to the defendants and the company. Id.
55. Id. at 347.
56. Id. at 346.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
[Vol. 10:331
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cases to use the term plain sight or open view, 0° the Supreme
Court held that the search and seizure of bootlegging contraband
violated the fourth amendment. Law enforcement officials, who
knew several weeks in advance of the distilling operation, went to
the building used for the operation without an arrest or search
warrant, saw defendant in the process of making whiskey, arrested
him, subsequently searched the building, and seized the contra-
band. 1 The Court conceded that the arrest was valid because the
defendant was committing an offense in the presence of the
agents.6 2 However, the Court did not agree that this justified the
search and seizure that followed the arrest even though there ex-
isted a "long line of cases recognizing that an arresting officer may
look around at the time of the arrest and seize fruits and evidences
of crime or those contraband articles which are in plain sight and
in his immediate and discernible presence."63 Here the Court held
that the officers knew of the operation and what they would find
when they went to the building; therefore, the officers needed to
follow the dictates of the fourth amendment warrant requirement
to legitimate the search and seizure.64
These earlier cases demonstrate that there was a need for, and
that the Court was moving towards, a plain view exception to the
warrant requirement, independent of search incident grounds. Af-
ter the late 1940s, there began a shift away from the search inci-
dent rationale. The decision in Chimel v. California,5 decided in
1969, permanently limited searches incident to arrests to the body
of the arrestee and areas within his immediate control.66 In 1967
the Supreme Court decided Warden v. Hayden,7 which was the
first case to recognize a plain view exception; however, the Court
60. Id. at 704.
61. Id. at 702-03.
62. Id. at 705.
63. Id. The Court distinguished Harris in that the seizure of property was
only after officers had "unexpectedly" come upon it during the search, as opposed
to the situation in Trupiano, where the officers knew long in advance what they
would find. Id. at 708-09. The unexpectancy language is akin to the "incidental
discovery" language used in Go Bart, 282 U.S. 344, which eventually became the
"inadvertent discovery" prong of Coolidge.
64. Id. at 706.
65. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
66. Id. at 763. The Chimel court construed "immediate control" to mean the
area from which an arrestee might "gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." Id.
67. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
1988]
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did not articulate it as such. Hayden involved a warrantless search
of a house after a robbery suspect had been seen fleeing into the
house."' The officers arrested the suspect in an upstairs bedroom
after his wife had given them permission to enter and search the
house.6 9 The officers' search disclosed weapons and clothing of the
type the fleeing man was said to have worn. The defendant was
later convicted 70 upon this evidence.
The Supreme Court held that neither the warrantless entry
nor the search was invalid.71 The Court determined that the entry
fell under the hot pursuit exception to the warrant requirement,
and it upheld the search on the grounds that a "thorough search"
was the only way to insure that the defendant was the only man
present in the house and that all of the weapons were under the
control of the police.72 The defendant contended that the clothing
should have been suppressed because the officer who found it in a
downstairs washing machine could not have been looking for a sus-
pect or weapons, but the Court disagreed. "[I]t cannot be said on
this record that the officer who found the clothes in the washing
machine was not searching for weapons. '7 The Court allowed an
officer to seize evidence, admissible at trial, if the officer conducted
a lawful warrantless search, limited by the exigencies of the situa-
tion, and came across evidence in plain view unrelated to the exi-
gency. Thus, the Hayden Court laid the groundwork for plain view
searches and seizures.
The Supreme Court did not fully articulate plain view as a
doctrine and exception to the warrant requirement until Coolidge
68. Id. at 297.
69. Id. at 297-98.
70. Id. at 296.
71. Id. at 298.
72. Id. at 299. The Court distinguished Hayden from Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145 (1947), by stating it was not upholding the search because it was
incident to arrest. It sustained the search because it was the only means to pre-
vent the suspect from resisting or escaping. The Court stated that the permissible
scope must be broad enough to allow law enforcement to achieve their goal. Id.
73. Id. The main issue before the Court was the distinction between "mere
evidence," which as a general rule was immune from seizure, and instrumentali-
ties, fruits, and contraband, which were validly seizable. Id. at 300. The court of
appeals below had held that the clothing seized from the washing machine was
inadmissible because it was "mere evidence." Id. The Supreme Court rejected the
distinction, stating that nothing in the fourth amendment supports the distinc-
tion. Id. at 300-01.
338 [Vol. 10:331
8
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/6
PLAIN VIEW SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
v. New Hampshire.7 4 In Coolidge, the Supreme Court held that a
search and subsequent seizure of an automobile belonging to a
murder suspect violated his fourth amendment rights.75 As in Tru-
piano,76 the police in Coolidge "had ample opportunity to obtain a
valid warrant" but failed to do so. 77
The Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that the car
could be seized because it was an "instrumentality of the crime"
and in plain view on the defendant's property. 78 According to the
Court, "[t]he problem with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to
identify the circumstances in which plain view has legal signifi-
cance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal. ' 79 Thereafter, the Court discussed the three
requisite elements necessary for plain view to have legal signifi-
cance. First, initial entry must be justified either by a warrant or
by one of the exceptions"0 to the warrant clause."' Second, the of-
ficer must inadvertently come across the evidence."2 If the officers
know what they will find in advance, as in Coolidge and Trupiano,
then they must obtain a warrant before they search or seize any
evidence. Lastly, it must be immediately apparent to the officer
that he has evidence before him.83 The concern here lies in dis-
couraging a "general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges. 8 4 This test for ap-
74. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
75. Id.
76. 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
77. 403 U.S. at 472. The police had a search warrant for the car, but the
Supreme Court held it was invalid because it had not been issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate. Id. at 449. The warrant had been issued by the attorney
general who was personally in charge of the investigation. Id. at 447. Thereafter,
the State proposed theories that it contended brought the search and subsequent
seizure of the car within the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 448.
One theory was a search incident to arrest, "that the police may make a warrant-
less search of an automobile whenever they have probable cause to do so," Id. at
458; see Carroll v. United States, 276 U.S. 132 (1925). The state also contended
that the car was an instrumentality of the crime and in plain view. 403 U.S. at
464. The Court rejected all three grounds.
78. 403 U.S. at 464.
79. Id. at 465.
80. The Court named the hot pursuit exception and the search incident to
arrest exception if limited in scope. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 466.
83. Id.
84. Id.
1988]
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plying the plain view doctrine appears simple enough at first
glance. However, the last element of immediate apparency has
caused some inconsistency and confusion in the case law since Coo-
lidge. The Supreme Court had never stated the precise degree of
immediate apparency until Hicks. Before Hicks, some courts re-
quired nothing less than probable cause, while other courts allowed
reasonable suspicion to satisfy the requirement.
For example, in dicta in Payton v. New York,"5 the Supreme
Court stated, "[tihe seizure of property in plain view involves no
invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming that
there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal ac-
tivity."8 However, in Texas v. Brown87 the Supreme Court implied
that a lesser standard may be acceptable in certain situations. In
Brown, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after a state court
rejected the State's argument that the plain view doctrine justified
the seizure of a "heroin balloon."88 The Court granted certiorari
"[b]ecause of the apparent uncertainty concerning the scope and
applicability of the [plain view] doctrine." ' 9 The Court accepted
the "statement of the rule from Payton .. . requiring probable
cause for seizure in the ordinary case," 90 and held that the officer
did indeed have probable cause.91 However, the Court in a footnote
made clear that it was not addressing "whether, in some circum-
stances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be
sufficient basis for a seizure in certain cases. "92 The Court's state-
ment implies that there may be occasions where a standard less
than probable cause is acceptable and demonstrates the Court's re-
luctance, before Hicks, to take a firm position on the issue.
85. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
86. Id. at 587. Payton involved the warrantless entry into the home of de-
fendant and the warrantless arrest of defendant. While there, the officers seized a
shell casing in plain view. The Court ruled only on the constitutionality of the
entry and arrest; it never reached the issue of the seizure of the shell since the
unreasonable warrantless entry automatically invalidated the subsequent war-
rantless seizure. See also id. at 576.
87. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
88. Heroin is sometimes packaged for sale in tied off party balloons. Id at
734.
89. Id. at 733.
90. Id. at 742.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 742 n.7.
[Vol. 10:331
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ANALYSIS
The decision in Arizona v. Hicks consisted of three holdings.
The Court first held that the "mere recording of the [stereo com-
ponents'] serial numbers did not constitute a seizure."93 The re-
cording was not a seizure, the Court concluded, because it was not
an additional interference with the defendant's "possessory inter-
est. ' 94 However, moving the stereo equipment did constitute a
search, which was unrelated to the original entry. 5 The Court held
that taking action, i.e., picking up the turntable to view the serial
number, was an additional invasion of defendant's privacy that
was "unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the en-
try."9 Further, the Court stated that it did not matter what the
search uncovered, because "[a] search is a search" no matter what
it discloses.7
Upon determining that the officer's moving the equipment was
a search, the Court held that the search was not reasonable.9 The
Court stated that the plain view doctrine did not make the search
reasonable because the officer did not have probable cause to be-
lieve the stereo equipment was stolen; rather, he had only a rea-
sonable suspicion that it was stolen.9 9 Before an officer may seize
items in plain view, he must have probable cause to believe the
items are evidence of crime or contraband.100 As stated previously,
the Court rationalized the probable cause requirement by stating
that there was no reason to require a lesser standard of cause in a
warrantless search and seizure than would be required if the police
knew they would be encountering the evidence or contraband.101
The Court also held that the officer's actions could not be up-
held on grounds that it was not a full-blown search but only a cur-
sory inspection that could be justified by reasonable suspicion in-
stead of probable cause.102 The Court stated that a "truly cursory
inspection" is not a search at all, because it does not involve mov-
93. 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1153.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The Court stated that it had "not ruled on the question whether
probable cause is required in order to invoke the 'plain view' doctrine." Id.
101. Id. at 1154.
102. Id.
1988] 341
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ing the item; rather, it involves "merely looking at what is already
exposed to view."108 The Court refused to "send police and judges
into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek a creature of
uncertain description that is neither a plain-view inspection nor
yet a 'full blown search.' """'
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the officer's ac-
tions could be upheld on the grounds that it was a cursory inspec-
tion of the equipment.1 0 5 She concluded that the officer embarked,
not on a full-blown search requiring probable cause, but rather a
mere inspection that could be supported by the less strict standard
of reasonable suspicion. 06 Justice O'Connor agreed with the major-
ity that the officer needed probable cause before he seized an item
or conducted a full-blown search of an item in plain view, but she
did not believe a "mere inspection of a suspicious item must be
supported by probable cause. 1 07 She stated than an "overwhelm-
ing majority of both state and federal courts have held that proba-
ble cause is not required for a minimal inspection of an item in
plain view"' 08 and cited several cases supporting this proposi-
tion.109 Justice Powell 10 also wrote a dissenting opinion in which
he stated that the "distinction" ' the Court made "between 'look-
ing' at a suspicious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few
inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment.11 2 Both dissenting jus-
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1159-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1157.
107. Id. at 1158.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1158-59. See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982); United States
v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Roberts, 696 F.2d 379
(5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979). See also infra
notes 122-132 and accompanying text.
110. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1155 (Powell, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice joined
Justice O'Connor and Justice Powell in their dissents. Id. Justice White con-
curred only to emphasize that Arizona v. Hicks had nothing to do with the inad-
vertent discovery prong of Coolidge. Id. at 1155 (White, J., concurring).
111. 107 S. Ct. at 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1157. Justice Powell included an interesting footnote proposing
the scenario where a policeman coming upon two watches, one face up and the
other face down, can read the serial number of the face-down watch. Justice Pow-
ell pointed out that reading the serial number would be constitutionally valid, but
to turn the other watch over in order to reach the number would be an unreasona-
ble search according to Arizona v. Hicks. Id at 1157 n.4.
342 [Vol. 10:331
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tices voiced their fears concerning the effect Arizona v. Hicks
would have on effective law enforcement.' "
Arizona v. Hicks inevitably will have a profound effect on ex-
isting plain view search and seizure law. Undoubtedly, the Su-
preme Court saw a need to address the probable cause issue Hicks
presented but, by doing so, and by taking the position it did, the
Court in effect did away with the flexible approach Coolidge" 4 of-
fered. The Court could have easily decided that the officer's search
and seizure met the three Coolidge requirements. The initial entry
was valid due to the exigency of the situation." 5 The discovery of
the stereo equipment was inadvertent because the only things the
police knew in advance they might find were possibly the shooter,
other victims, and/or weapons." 6 Finally, it can be argued that it
was immediately apparent to the officer that he had 'evidence of
crime before him due to the scant furnishings in the apartment," 7
the expensive equipment,"' and the other evidence that was
found, specifically a stocking mask," 9 which is a regular tool of
thieves. If the Coolidge plurality intended the language "immedi-
ately apparent" to mean probable cause, then, in the words of Jus-
tice O'Connor in her dissent in the present case, "I have little
doubt that it was satisfied here. "120
Not only has the Court put an end to the flexibility offered by
Coolidge, but it has also directly overruled several state and fed-
eral court decisions.' 2' For example, in United States v. Mar-
bury, 22 the Court held that:
113. Id. at 1157 (Powell, J., dissenting), 1160 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. 403 U.S. 443.
115. Id. at 1152.
116. Id. at 1150.
117. Id. at 1152.
118. Id. at 1150.
119. Id. at 1160.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1158-59. The state and lower federal court cases cited were cited
by Justice O'Connor in her dissent.
122. 732 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1984) On a tip from two informants, Louisiana
law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant to search a gravel pit owned
by the defendant in hopes of finding a large truck, trailer, and bulldozer that had
been stolen from a Mississippi construction company. They found the truck but
had to stop the search due to darkness. They obtained a second warrant and dur-
ing this search recorded serial numbers of other equipment they believed to be
stolen. After checking the numbers they obtained a third warrant for two other
pieces of equipment. The court held that the plain view doctrine applied and that
no general search had been made. Id. at 393.
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actions of officers executing duly issued search warrants, in copy-
ing down identification numbers from several items of equipment
not named in the warrants but believed to be stolen, were proper
in view of the fact that the items of equipment in question were
in plain view and the officers did not have to use particularly in-
trusive means to retrieve the numbers. 12 3
Similarly, in United States v. Hillyard,'124 the Court specifically
held that "an officer may inspect an item found in plain view to
determine whether it is evidence of a crime if he at least has a
reasonable suspicion to believe that the discovered item is evi-
dence. ' ' 2' The Court in United States v. Wright12 stated, "the in-
criminating nature of an item . . . may not be immediately appar-
ent without a closer inspection of the item. 1 2 7 The Court went on
to say that "the cases indicate that an officer may conduct such an
examination if he has at least a 'reasonable suspicion' to believe
that the discovered item is evidence."1 2 8 In United States v. Rob-
erts,2 9 the Court held that "[plolice officers are not required to
ignore the significance of items in plain view even when the full
import of objects cannot be positively ascertained without some
123. Id. at 392.
124. 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982) Defendant was convicted on interstate
transportation of stolen motor vehicles, concealment of stolen motor vehicle, and
interstate transportation of stolen property. While examining the vehicles the of-
ficers seized a notebook and logbook from the cab of one of the vehicles. The
logbook and notebook incriminated the defendant. The court held it was reasona-
ble for the officers to peruse or skim through the items to see if they were relevant
and that these items could be admitted into evidence. Id. at 1338-39.
125. Id. at 1342.
126. 667 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1982) Officer came across ledger in the defend-
ant's residence during search for objects named in warrant for tax evasion. The
court held the officer was justified in inspecting the ledger to determine if the
item specified in the warrant was hidden there. Id. at 798. Here, however, the
officer exceeded his authority by perusing the contents; therefore, the ledger
should have been suppressed. Id. at 799.
127. Id. at 797.
128. Id. at 798.
129. 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980) Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
operate an illegal gambling business, operating such a business, and failure to file
a special tax return. When sheriff deputies went to execute a search warrant for a
stolen television set, they saw in plain view evidence of the gambling business and
seized it. The court held that, because the initial intrusion was justified and the
observation and determination of the gambling evidence was inadvertent, the
seizure was proper under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 380-81.
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examination. '180 Lastly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Ochs' stated that, "when in the course of a legal
warrantless search a police officer comes upon a suspicious object,
he is entitled to inspect it and, if it consists of fruits, instrumental-
ities or evidence of crime, to seize it, even though the crime was
not that which justified the search." '182
Several state courts also have upheld examinations of items in
plain view based on a reasonable suspicion.'33 For example, the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Noll" 4 held that "the inspec-
tion of the television set for the purpose of copying down the serial
number was not unreasonable. . . ."35 The television was "appar-
ent to the police officers as soon as they entered the kitchen," they
were lawfully in a position to view the television, and one of the
officers "had a reasonable suspicion that the television was stolen
. . . ."I" The Supreme Court of North Dakota, in a case 137 almost
identical to Arizona v. Hicks, stated "we believe that the officer's
reasonable suspicions that the oven was stolen goods justified the
very minimal intrusion on privacy to check the serial number.
Upon verification of its stolen character via radio, it was 'immedi-
130. Id. at 381.
131. 595 F.2d 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) Defendant was charged and convicted on
use of extortionate means to collect a loan, obstruction of justice, and falsely sub-
scribing income tax returns. He sought reversal on the grounds that the police
had conducted an illegal search of his car. The court held that even if the govern-
ment was obliged to rely on the plain view doctrine the limitations of Coolidge
had been met. Id. at 1250-51, 1258-59.
132. Id. at 1256.
133. 107 S. Ct. at 1159.
134. 116 Wis. 2d 443, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984) Defendant, who was charged
with burglary, sought suppression of a television set that was seized from his fa-
ther's home when the officers executed a search warrant for items stolen from an
auction. A television set was not named in the warrant. The court held that the
combination of factors-the type of television, burglary of a home a few miles
away, etc.-was sufficient to arouse a reasonable suspicion the television was sto-
len. Upon finding it was stolen a second warrant was executed; the television was
seized and later introduced at trial.
135. Id. at 466, 343 N.W.2d at 402.
136. Id.
137. State v. Reidinger, 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985) Officers obtained a war-
rant to search defendant's house after an undercover drug deal in which the de-
fendant was arrested. The warrant named controlled substances and currency.
During the search the police found a microwave oven in a cooler. The officers
picked up the oven to record the serial number and radioed the number to the
National Crime Information Center. Upon learning it was stolen they seized it.
The court upheld the seizure and subsequent admission at trial. Id. at 869, 876.
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ately apparent' that there was probable cause to justify its seizure
as stolen property contraband.' 1 8 In State v. Hoffman, 39 the
North Carolina Supreme Court also held that "[b]eing lawfully in
defendant's residence, the officers could examine and, without a
warrant, seize 'suspicious objects in plain sight' . . .. If the of-
ficers' presence was lawful, the observation and seizure of what was
then and there apparent could not in itself be unlawful. ' 140
Another unfavorable effect of the Hicks decision is the incon-
sistency it appears to have created with other landmark United
States Supreme Court cases. Specifically, how does one rationalize
the holding in Terry v. Ohio'4 ' with the holding in the present
case? In Terry, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may
conduct a limited search of a person for weapons if he reasonably
believes the person is armed." Further, the Court stated that the
exclusionary rule "cannot properly be invoked to exclude the prod-
ucts of legitimate police investigative techniques . ... The
Court would allow a limited search of a person based on less than
probable cause but would not allow a limited search of an item in
plain view, believed to be evidence of crime, on less than probable
cause. Clearly, the search of a person intrudes and interferes with
one's privacy interest more than the examination of property, yet
the Court allows the former and not the latter. In fact, an officer's
mere movement of an item in plain view is much more limited, for
fourth amendment purposes, than his patdown of a person.
United States v. Place14 4 also seems to conflict with the Hicks
138. Id. at 875.
139. 281 N.C. 727, 190 S.E.2d 842 (1972) Defendant was indicted and con-
victed of murder. He appealed on grounds that his motion to suppress a rifle
found in his home should not have been denied. The rifle had been seized after
officers in search of defendant entered his home and observed the rifle. The court
held that the officers were lawfully in defendant's home; therefore, the observa-
tion and seizure of what was in plain view was not unlawful. Id. at 728-731, 736-
37, 190 S.E. 2d at 844-46, 849.
140. Id. at 736, 190 S.E.2d at 849.
141. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry involved a "cop on the beat" who observed the
defendants apparently "casing" a store. He observed defendants from a distance,
and when he was reasonably certain they were planning a robbery, he approached
them and conducted a patdown. Id. at 5-7.).
142. Id. at 30.
143. Id. at 13.
144. 462 U.S. 696 (1983) Place involved a stop of defendant at the Miami
International Airport because defendant fit a drug courier profile. Defendant was
late for his flight so DEA agents let him go but called ahead to New York's La
Guardia to alert the agents there. When Place landed, DEA agents approached
[Vol. 10:331
16
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol10/iss2/6
PLAIN VIEW SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
decision. In Place, the Court held, based on Terry, that Drug En-
forcement Administration agents could detain a person's luggage
for a limited time based on a reasonable suspicion that the luggage
contained narcotics. 5 The Court stated that a properly limited
detention is a minimal intrusion and that the fourth amendment
does not prohibit such detentions. 146 It seems totally inconsistent
that the Court would allow the warrantless seizure of a person's
luggage on less than probable cause but would not allow an officer,
on less than probable cause, to move a piece of equipment in plain
view to ascertain a serial number. In this case, as with the search
of the person, the detention of the luggage is much more intrusive
than the limited inspection of a plain view item.
While Arizona v. Hicks is inconsistent with Terry and Place
on the type of police conduct the Court allowed on a reasonable
suspicion standard, Hicks is also inconsistent with Texas v.
Brown 4 7 on the facts. In Brown, the Court upheld a plain view
seizure of a heroin balloon taken from the defendant after he had
been stopped at a license check.'48 The officer testified that, based
on his experience in drug offense arrests, he was aware that people
packaged narcotics in such balloons. 4 9 Similarly, in Arizona v.
Hicks, the officer knew from years of police experience and work-
ing on different burglary crimes that the stereo equipment found
in Hicks's apartment was of a type commonly stolen.' 50 In Brown,
the officer picked up the balloon' 15 to ascertain if it contained any-
him and noticed discrepancies in the addresses on his luggage. They then took
defendant's luggage to another airport for a canine sniff. The dog reacted posi-
tively to one bag, and because it was late Friday the agents kept the luggage until
Monday when they could secure a search warrant. The Court held limited deten-
tions of person's luggage was constitutionally valid if based on a reasonable suspi-
cion. Here it held the detention was too long. Id. at 698-99, 710.
145. Id. at 698.
146. Id.
147. 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 734.
150. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting).
151. 460 U.S. at 734. In Brown, the officer also had plain view of the glove
box where he saw small plastic vials, quantities of loose white powder, and an
open bag of party balloons. Brown could not produce a driver's license. Id. The
other paraphernalia observed by the officer in Brown are similar to the other
items observed by the officer in Hicks. Those other items consisted of weapons,
ammunitition, a stocking mask, and various drug paraphernalia. The Court
should have found that the officer in Hicks, like the officer in Brown, also had
probable cause to believe the stereo was stolen property.
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thing and, determining that it did, he seized it.152 In Hicks, the
officer had to move the stereo equipment to ascertain the serial
number, and after police headquarters informed him the serial
number matched that of stolen property, he seized it. 153 These two
fact situations are similar enough to warrant upholding the search
and seizure in Hicks on the same grounds as those in Brown, i.e.,
that at the time the officer seized the balloon he had probable
cause to do so.154 Had the Hicks Court addressed the issue of
whether the officer had probable cause to believe the stereo equip-
ment was stolen, then it inevitably would have reached the same
conclusion as did the court in Brown. As Justice Powell said in his
Hicks dissent, "Indeed, the State was unwise to concede the ab-
sence of probable cause." '55
Another aspect of the Arizona v. Hicks decision is the
profound and far-reaching effect it will have on law enforcement
authorities. Hicks fails to recognize the importance of police expe-
rience. The officer in Hicks knew that the type of stereo he came
across in Hicks's apartment was a common target of thieves from
his years of experience on burglary cases, and this is one of the
several factors which led him to suspect it was stolen.5 '
In the past, the Supreme Court has given due weight to police
experience when analyzing police conduct. For example, in United
States v. Cortez,1 57 the Court addresses whether a stop to search
for illegal aliens was permissible. It stated that "the totality of the
circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into account
152. Id.
153. 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
154. Brown, 460 U.S. at 744.
155. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting).
156. Id.
157. 449 U.S. 411 (1981) Cortez involved the Border Patrol's attempt to
catch a person they called Chevron who they believed was bringing illegal aliens
over the border. From their surveillance they knew one person with a Chevron
symbol shoe sole was leading many other persons over the border. They also knew
that he made these trips on weekend nights very late. Acting on this information,
they set up a stake-out on the road they suspected Chevron would use to trans-
port the aliens. While the officers were in location, they saw a camper truck make
several trips. This was the only vehicle that was observed. Subsequently, the of-
ficers, based on a reasonable suspicion that the camper contained aliens, stopped
the vehicles and found Chevron and several illegal aliens. The Court held the stop
of the vehicle was constitutionally valid because based on the whole picture the
officers could reasonably surmise that the vehicle was involved in criminal activ-
ity. Id. at 413-16, 421.
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... Further, "when used by trained law enforcement officers,
objective facts, meaningless to the untrained, can be combined
with permissible deductions from such facts to form a legitimate
basis for suspicion of a particular person and for action on that
suspicion."'' " The Court's decision in Hicks undoubtedly will ham-
per effective law enforcement in plain view situations where quick
thinking and quick action are usually necessary. The decision
forces police officers, who encounter items in plain view believed to
be evidence or contraband of crime, to risk losing the evidence or
contraband in the time it takes to obtain a warrant. Preventing
police officers from acting on their reasonable suspicions frustrates
effective crime detection and prevention and does not further
fourth amendment interests. This is especially true in situations,
as in Hicks, where the intrusion is so very minimal, the items are
in plain view anyway, and the odds are that the police are correct.
Alternatively, the Court could have adopted the approach pro-
posed in Delaware v. Prouse.'0 There the Court stated:
Thus, the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice
is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate govern-
mental interests. Implemented in this manner, the reasonableness
standard usually requires, at a minimum, that the facts upon
which an intrusion is based be capable of measurement against
'an objective standard,' whether this be probable cause or a less
stringent test.'6'
Had the Court adopted this balancing test, the decision in Arizona
v. Hicks would have most likely been in favor of the state. The
officer's movement of the turntable to view the serial numbers
minimally intruded or interfered with Hicks' privacy or possessory
interest. The movement was minimally intrusive in that the item
was in plain view, and the officers were lawfully in the apartment
158. Id. at 417.
159. Id. at 419.
160. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) Prouse involved a license check in which the arrest-
ing officer smelled marijuana as he approached the car and saw marijuana in plain
view. He seized the marijuana and the defendant was subsequently convicted.
The Court rejected the government's argument for complete discretion in stop-
ping vehicles for license and registration check but upheld a reasonable suspicion
standard if the officer believed the driver to be unlicensed, the car unregistered,
or an occupant or the vehicle to be otherwise in violation of the law. Id. at 650,
663.
161. Id. at 654 (footnotes omitted).
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due to the exigent circumstances Hicks had created by allowing
the shot to be fired. Detecting and apprehending criminals, partic-
ularly those like Hicks, who was apparently involved in a variety of
criminal activities, is an important and legitimate governmental in-
terest.162 Obviously, the detection and apprehension of criminal ac-
tivity outweighs the minimal intrusion of one's privacy interest.
Had the Court applied this approach, it could have avoided throw-
ing out evidence and convictions in future cases where the officers
acted in good faith and on a reasonable suspicion that, as in Hicks,
was supported by twelve years' experience in the field.' 8
The Court could have followed the course proposed by Justice
O'Connor's dissent, that the mere inspection of items in plain view
may be done on reasonable suspicion.' This would have been con-
sistent with the patdown of a person on reasonable suspicion, as in
Terry v. Ohio'6 5 and the detention of luggage based on reasonable
suspicion, as in United States v. Place.6' If the Court is going to
allow a limited search of a person and detention of personal effects
based on a reasonable suspicion, then there is no apparent reason
why it should not allow a limited inspection of items in plain view
by an officer who is lawfully in a position to see the item based on
this same standard.
CONCLUSION
The position of the the Hicks Court, requiring probable cause
for an inspection of an item in plain view, answers the questions
Coolidge left unanswered. Specifically, what is meant by the lan-
guage "immediately apparent"? Henceforth, for a plain view item
to be seized or inspected more closely, the officer must have proba-
ble cause to believe the item is evidence or an instrumentality of
crime, or contraband. Probable cause is now the functional
equivalent of immediate apparency. The advantage of this decision
is that it provides the judiciary with a bright-line test for deter-
162. The opinion stated the officers found a sawed-off shotgun, ammunition
and other weapons; thus, Hicks could have been guilty of firearm violations. They
also found drug paraphernalia and evidence of larceny, the stereo equipment, and
a stocking mask. 107 S. Ct. 1149, 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell
stated, "[wihat they saw in the apartment hardly suggested that it was occupied
by law-abiding citizens." Id. at 1156.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1157 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
165. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
166. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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mining if evidence seized in plain view is admissible. However, for
all the benefit this holding provides the courts, the law enforce-
ment agencies are burdened to that extent and more.
Further, Hicks is inconsistent with Terry and Place. This in-
consistency raises the question of why the Supreme Court allows
the more intrusive searches on the lessser degree of cause than the
less intrusive search. The decisions in these cases appear
irreconcilible.
Lastly, it is difficult to understand why the Court took such a
cut-and-dried approach to a procedural problem that can be han-
dled easily by a case-by-case balancing test approach or an appli-
cation of a less rigid reasonable suspicion standard. As the Court
noted in Terry v. Ohio, "it is frequently argued that in dealing
with the rapidly unfolding and often dangerous situations on city
streets the police are in need of an escalating set of flexible re-
sponses, graduating in relation to the amount of information they
possess. '1 7 So, too, the police must in plain view situations instan-
taneously reflect and react.
With the decision in Hicks, the police can no longer use flexi-
ble responses based on experience and intuition in plain view situ-
ations. The short term effect of Hicks will be the suppression of
very valuable evidence and many overturned convictions. Ulti-
mately, if these disadvantages begin to outweigh whatever fourth
amendment protection was gained from the decision, then the
Court may be forced to apply a balancing test and reassess Arizona
v. Hicks.
Tonya C. Cumalander
167. 392 U.S. at 10.
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